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Sullivan: The Admissibility of Prior Acquittal Evidence - Has North Carolin

NOTES

THE ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR ACQUITTAL EVIDENCE - HAS NORTH CAROLINA ADOPTED THE
"MINORITY VIEW"?

-

THE EFFECT OF State v. Scott1

"[A]cquittal reflects both an institutional interest in preserving
the finality of judgments and a strong public interest
in protecting
2
individuals against governmental overreaching."
INTRODUCTION

Imagine you are on trial. After the State musters all of its
evidence and presents it to the trier of fact, you are acquitted. In
the eyes of the law you are innocent, no longer required to answer
for the alleged wrongdoing. However, in reality, this is not always
the case; the vast majority3 of state and federal courts allow evil.331 N.C. 39, 413 S.E.2d 787 (1992).
2. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 355 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).

3. See, e.g., Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990) (evidence of other
crimes is admissible); Oliphant v. Koehler, 594 F.2d 547 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 877 (1979) (same); United States v. Kills Plenty, 466 F.2d 240 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973) (same); United States v. Castro-Castro,
464 F.2d 336 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973) (same); United
States v. Van Cleave, 599 F.2d 954 (10th Cir. 1979) (same); United States v. Hill,
550 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa.), affd mem., 716 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1039 (1984) (same); Mitchell v. State, 37 So. 76 (Ala. 1904) (same); Ladd
v. State, 568 P.2d 960 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928 (1978) (same);
People v. Griffin, 426 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1967) (same); State v. Gibson, 675 P.2d 33
(Idaho 1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1220 (1984) (same); State v. Schlue, 323 A.2d
549 (N.J. Super.), cert. denied, 331 A-2d 16 (N.J. 1979) (same); State v. Smith,
532 P.2d 9 (Or. 1975) (same); State v. Tarman, 621 P.2d 737 (Wash. App. 1980)
(same); Eatherton v. State, 810 P.2d 93 (Wyo. 1991) (same). See also Christopher
Bello, Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence as to Other Offense as Affected by
Defendant's Acquittal of That Offense, 25 A.L.R. 4th 934 (1983). The author
propounds that:
[A] majority of jurisdictions [follow the rule] ...that otherwise relevant
and admissible evidence of another offense is not rendered inadmissible
by the fact of the defendant's previous acquittal of that other offense,
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dence used in a prior trial-even though the person was acquitted
of the offense-to be admitted4 in a subsequent trial, when the
evidence sought to be introduced is relevant 5 and not otherwise
precluded on constitutional grounds 6 While the majority of state
and federal courts allow such evidence, the North Carolina
Supreme Court, in its recent decision of State v. Scott, 7 adopted
what is considered the "minority view."' The court's holding in
except to the extent that the acquittal may be a factor to be weighed in
the discretionary balancing by the trial judge of the probative value of
the evidence against its unfairly prejudicial effect, and in determining
the threshold question of whether the evidence is sufficiently convincing
to warrant its admission.
Id. at 939.
4. Admissible evidence is defined as "evidence introduced [which] is of such a
character that the court or judge is bound to receive it; that is allow it to be
introduced at trial." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 44 (5th ed. 1979). See infra note
63.
5. Relevant evidence is defined as "[elvidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." BLAcK's
LAW DICTIONARY

1160 (5th ed. 1979). See infra note 62.

6. Bello, supra note 3, at 939. The issue of preclusion on constitutional
grounds generally encompasses the application of the collateral estoppel
doctrine, see infra note 98, and/or the protection afforded against double
jeopardy, see infra note 97, pursuant to U.S. "CoNsT. amend. V. The Fifth
Amendment protection against double jeopardy provides that: "nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb[ ] ... ." Id. The question of preclusion on either one of these grounds will not
be discussed in this Note, other than in the makeup of the court's ruling under
Rule 403. For a more complete discussion of the collateral estoppel and double
jeopardy issues, along with the recent Supreme Court ruling in Dowling v.
United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990), see generally Craig L. Crawford, Case
Comment, Dowling v. United States:A Failureof the CriminalJustice System, 52
OHIO ST. L.J. 991 (1991); Cynthia L. Randall, Comment, Acquittals in Jeopardy:
Criminal CollateralEstoppel and the Use of Acquitted Act Evidence, 141 U. PA.
L. REV. 283 (1992); Ronald A. Goldstein, Recent Development, Double Jeopardy,
Due Process, and Evidence From PriorAcquittals: Dowling v. United States, 110
S.Ct. 668 (1990), 13 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1027 (1990).
7. 331 N.C. 39, 413 S.E.2d 787 (1992).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Schwab, 886 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1080 (1990); Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209 (5th Cir.
1972); United States v. Day, 591 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1979); State v. Little, 350
P.2d 756 (Ariz. 1960); State v. Perkins, 349 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1977); State v.
Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 1979); State v. Holman, 611 S.W.2d 411
(Tenn. 1981). See also Bello, supra note 3, at 939. The author concludes that "[a]
few jurisdictions follow the rule that such evidence is never admissible, basing
such rule either on the concept of fundamental fairness . . ., or on the rationale

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss2/4

2

1994]

Sullivan: The Admissibility of Prior Acquittal Evidence - Has North Carolin
233
PRIOR ACQUITrAL EVIDENCE

Scott renders evidence, whose "probative value depends[ ] .
upon the proposition that the defendant. .. committed the prior
crime", per se inadmissible in a subsequent trial, when in fact the
defendant was previously acquitted of that prior offense." 9 Not
only does this decision refuse to follow the vast majority of state
and federal courts, it departs from what appeared to be the position of the courts in North Carolina. 10
This Note will examine the court's decision in State v. Scott."
First, the Note will address the facts of the case. Second, it will
set out the background on how courts decide whether evidence of
this nature should be admitted, mainly focusing on Rules 403 and
404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.' 2 Next, the Note
will analyze how the court arrived at this "bright-line" rule as well
as the effect it will have in future cases. Finally, the Note will
conclude that even though North Carolina adopted the "minority
rule", this approach is proper under the concept of fundamental
that the prejudicial effect of such evidence necessarily outweighs its probative
value .... " Id.
9. Scott, 331 N.C. at 42, 413 S.E.2d at 788.
10. See Bello, supra notes 3 and 8. For a series of cases in North Carolina,
although in the context of impeachment of witnesses, allowing the admissibility
of such prior acquittal evidence, see generally State v. Royal, 300 N.C. 515, 268
S.E.2d 517 (1980) (established principle that when a criminal defendant elects to
testify on his own behalf, he is subject to cross-examination, for the purpose of
impeachment, with respect to prior specific criminal acts or degrading conduct
even if there was no conviction); State v. Leonard, 300 N.C. 223, 266 S.E.2d 631,
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 960 (1980) (cross-examination of defendant concerning a
prior shooting for which defendant had been found not guilty by reason of
temporary insanity); State v. Herbin, 298 N.C. 441, 259 S.E.2d 263 (1979)
(concluding that it is permissible to cross-examine a defendant about a specific
act of misconduct even though the defendant has been acquitted of charges
arising out of the misconduct); State v. Ross, 295 N.C. 488, 246 S.E.2d 780 (1978)
(approving of cross-examination about the defendant's prior possession of drugs
despite the fact that charges against defendant had been dismissed because the
search that disclosed the drugs was declared unlawful).
11. 331 N.C. 39, 413 S.E.2d 787 (1992).
12. It should be noted that any reference to rules of evidence throughout this
Note, unless otherwise indicated, will be in reference to the North Carolina Rules
in contrast to the Federal Rules. In addition, there are other rules involved in
the determination of admissibility, however, those rules will not be discussed in
the text of this Note. For a discussion of those rules, see infra notes 62 and 63.
Furthermore, there are also constitutional issues generally addressed when the
use of prior acquittal evidence is presented. However, due to the defendant's
failure to raise these issues at trial, and the court's refusal to address them on
appeal, those issues will not be examined either. For sources dealing with those
constitutional questions, see supra note 6.
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fairness and the constitutional parameters that underlie the
court's decision.

13

THE CASE

On the evening of June 26, 1988, the victim, an adult female,
drove to a neighboring town to visit with one of her friends who
was working at the time. 14 The victim, after chatting and staying
only briefly, agreed to go to a nearby convenience store to
purchase a few items for her friend.1 5 Upon arriving at the convenience store, the victim observed the defendant, Berry Scott,
whom she previously knew, but had not seen in approximately
two years.' 6 The defendant approached the victim and, after a
brief conversation, asked whether she could give him a ride
home.'" While explaining to the defendant that she had to return
to where her friend worked, the victim agreed.'
The defendant then accompanied the victim back to her
friend's place of work.' 9 However, shortly thereafter the defendant requested that the victim take him back to the convenience
store because he needed to purchase some cigarettes.2 ° Upon
leaving the convenience store the second time, however, the victim
testified that the defendant brandished a pocket knife, threatened
her, and eventually ordered her to drive elsewhere.2 '
After arriving at the requested location, the defendant
returned the knife to his pocket and took the keys from the ignition.22 Then the defendant requested again and again that the
victim exit the vehicle; but upon repeatedly refusing, the victim
was forcibly removed through the driver's side window.23 After
13. See generally Miguel Manuel Delao, Comment, Admissibility of Prior
Acquitted Crimes under Rule 404(b): Why the Majority Should Adopt the
Minority Rule, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1033 (1989) (author sets forth reasons why
the minority approach should prevail; primarily focusing on the prejudicial effect
of prior acquittal evidence and the constitutional infringements which occur in
the context of admitting prior acquittal evidence).
14. State v. Scott, 99 N.C. App. 113, 114, 382 S.E.2d 621, 622 (1990).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.

18. Id.
19. Id.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id. at 115, 382 S.E.2d at 622.
Id.
Id.
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subduing the victim outside the vehicle, the defendant forced her
to remove her clothing and engage in vaginal intercourse. 24 However, because of subsequent adverse weather conditions, the
defendant ordered the victim to move back into the vehicle, where
he again forced her to have intercourse with him.25 The defendant
then requested that the victim drive him back to his residence,
where for the final time he had intercourse with her as well as
having her perform fellatio on him.26 Eventually, the defendant
allowed the victim to leave. Subsequently, the State charged the
rape, 29 and a crime against
defendant with kidnapping,
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Scott, 99 N.C. App. at 115, 389 S.E.2d at 622. The defendant testified to
the fact that he performed cunnilingus on the prosecuting witness. Id. However,
it is unclear, from the facts of the case, whether the crime against nature charge
encompassed both the fellatio and cunnilingus acts or only one individual
offense. For a distinction between the two offenses, see infra note 30. The
supreme court refused to reverse the cunnilingus charge because consent is not a
defense. Scott, 331 N.C. at 46, 413 S.E.2d at 791. See also infra note 53.
27. Scott, 99 N.C. App. at 115, 382 S.E.2d at 622.
28. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39 (1993). Section 14-39 provides:
Kidnapping
(a) Any person who shall unlawfully confine, restrain, or remove
from one place to another, any other person 16 years of age or over
without the consent of such person, or any other person under the age of
16 years without the consent of a parent or legal custodian of such
person, shall be guilty of kidnapping if such confinement, restraint or
removal is for the purpose of:
(1) Holding such other person for a ransom or as a hostage or
using such other person as a shield; or
(2) Facilitating the commission of any felony or facilitating
flight of any person following the commission of a felony; or
(3) Doing serious bodily harm to or terrorizing the person so
confined, restrained or removed or any other person.
(4) Holding such other person in involuntary servitude in
violation of G.S. 14-43.2
(b) (Effective until January 1, 1995) There shall be two degrees of
kidnapping as defined by subsection (a). If the person kidnapped either
was not released by the defendant in a safe place or had been seriously
injured or sexually assaulted, the offense is kidnapping in the first
degree and is punishable as a Class D felony. If the person kidnapped
was released in a safe place by the defendant and had not been seriously
injured or sexually assaulted the offense is kidnapping in the second
degree and is punishable as a Class E felony.
(b) (Effective January 1, 1995) There shall be two degrees of
kidnapping as defined by subsection (a). If the person kidnapped either
was not released by the defendant in a safe place or had been seriously
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994
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30

nature.
During trial, the State sought to introduce the testimony of
Wanda Freedman, also a past acquaintance of the defendant, who
would testify that the defendant raped her two years earlier under
similar circumstances. 3 1 Defense counsel made a general objection to the introduction of the testimony, and a voir dire hearing
injured or sexually assaulted, the offense is kidnapping in the first
degree and is punishable as a Class C felony. If the person kidnapped
was released in a safe place by the defendant and had not been seriously
injured or sexually assaulted, the offense is kidnapping in the second
degree and is punishable as a Class E felony.
(c) Any firm or corporation convicted of kidnapping shall be
punished by a fine of not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000) nor
more than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), and its charter and
right to do business in the state of North Carolina shall be forfeited.
Id. See also BENJAMIN B. SENDOR, NORTH CAROLINA CRIMES, ch. 8, at 103 (3d ed.
1985) (essential elements are: (1) person confines or restrains or removes from
one place to another, (2) a person, (3) without his consent, and (4) for the purpose
of... (d) facilitating the commission of a felony).
29. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.3 (1993). Section 14-27.3 provides:
Second-degree rape
(a) A person is guilty of rape in the second degree if the person
engages in vaginal intercourse with another person:
(1) By force and against the will of the other person; or
(2) Who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or
physically helpless, and the person performing the act knows or should
reasonably know the other person is mentally defective, mentally
incapacitated, or physically helpless.
(b) (Effective until January 1, 1995) Any person who commits the
offense defined in this section is guilty of a Class D felony.
(b) (Effective January 1, 1995) Any person who commits the offense
defined in this section is guilty of a Class C felony.
Id.
30. Scott, 331 N.C. at 40, 413 S.E.2d at 788. For North Carolina's treatment
of crimes against nature, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1993). Section 14-177
provides:
Crime against nature (Effective until January 1, 1995)
If any person shall commit the crime against nature, with mankind
or beast, he shall be punished as a Class H felon.
Crime against nature (Effective January 1, 1995)
If any person shall commit the crime against nature, with mankind
or beast, he shall be punished as a Class I felon.
Id. See also SENDOR, supra note 28, at 266. The author describes two of the most
prevalent crimes against nature. First, is "[fjellatio [which] is the oral
stimulation of the male sexual organ by a female. [The other is] [c]unnilingus
[which] is the penetration of the female sex organ by the tongue." Id.
31. Scott, 331 N.C. at 41, 413 S.E.2d at 788. See also infra note 44.
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was conducted. 32 During voir dire, defense counsel opposed the
witness' testimony because the State previously tried the defendant for the offense relating to Ms. Freedman, which ultimately
resulted in an acquittal. 3 Counsel for the defendant argued that
the evidence arising from the prior offense should be precluded by
Rules 40334 and 404(b)35 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.3 6 The trial court, however, ruled the evidence admissible
to show "opportunity, intent, preparation and plan" 31 pursuant to
Rule 404(b).3 8 In addition, the trial judge ruled that the probative
value of the evidence outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice
under Rule 403. 3 9 At that point, the judge instructed 40 the jury

that the evidence could be considered on the issue of the defendant's "intent,4 ' knowledge, 42 plan, scheme or design".43 Then Ms.
Freedman testified, and her testimony, in many respects, paral32. Scott, 99 N.C. App. at 116-17, 392 S.E.2d at 623.
33. Id. The court of appeals also, in reviewing the voir dire hearing,
concluded that the defendant did not present his constitutional objections at
trial, and thus, he did not preserve them for appellate review. Id.
34. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (1992). See infra text accompanying
notes 67-75.
35. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 404 (1992). See infra text accompanying
notes 54-64.
36. Scott, 99 N.C. App. at 1*16, 392 S.E.2d at 623.
37. See infra notes 41-43.
38. Scott, 331 N.C. at 41-42, 413 S.E.2d at 788. See infra text accompanying
notes 54-64.
39. Scott, 331 N.C. at 41, 413 S.E.2d at 788. See infra text accompanying
notes 67-75.
40. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 105 (1992). Rule 105 provides:
Limited Admissibility
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one
purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is
admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its
proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.
Id. But see Goldstein, supra note 6, at 1027. The author may have hit the
proverbial "nail on-the-head" when he stated that "[i]nstructions are often the
only statements made from the bench telling jurors how they can lawfully
consider the introduced evidence. Yet those instructions are generally unclear
and difficult to follow, and they are widely thought to be disregarded by juries
once the door to the jury room closes." Id.
41. For North Carolina's treatment of other offense evidence to show intent
under Rule 404(b), see 1 HENRY BRANDIs, JR., BRANDIs ON NORTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE § 92, at 411 (3d ed. 1988). For federal and other state cases on the
same issue, see 1 JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 807 (4th
ed. 1992).
42. For North Carolina's treatment of other offense evidence showing
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994

7

238

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 4
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol.

16:231

leled the evidence in the case sub judice.4
At the close of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty
for a crime against nature, second-degree kidnapping, and three
counts of second-degree rape.4 5 On appeal, the court of appeals
found no error in the defendant's trial and entered judgments
knowledge under Rule 404(b), see 1 BANDis, supra note 41, at 416. For federal
and state cases on the same issue, see 1 STRONG, supra note 41, at 805.
43. Scott, 331 N.C. at 41, 413 S.E.2d at 788. For North Carolina's treatment
of other offense evidence to show a plan, scheme or design under Rule 404(b), see
1 BRANDIS, supra note 41, at 414-15. For federal and other state cases dealing
with the same issue, see 1 STRONG, supra note 41, at 800. Compare State v.
Scott, 331 N.C. 39, 413 S.E.2d 787 (1992) with Oliphant v. Koehler, 594 F.2d 547
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 877 (1979). In Oliphant,the defendant was also
being tried for rape, and the State sought to introduce the testimony of witnesses
who would testify that the defendant had also raped them in similar
circumstances. The defendant had been acquitted of those offenses, but the trial
court allowed the evidence to show a "common scheme, or plan." Id. However, it
is clear-in this author's opinion-from the facts in Oliphant that the defendant
did have a common scheme or plan. On the other hand, it may not have been so
clear in Scott. For a contrary view on whether it was clear that a plan existed in
Oliphant, and if there was a plan, whether it would be relevant, see Delao, supra
note 13, at 1057-58. The author argued that:
[T]o prove . . . scheme the government must prove the defendant
actually raped the two witnesses. Since the defendant was acquitted of
both charges, the two alleged rapes were irrelevant[,] . . . unless
orchestration of consensual sex diminishes the defense of consent to the
instant charge ....
Orchestration of consensual intercourse (seduction)
is not a crime; [non-]consensual intercourse is a crime.
Id.
44. Scott, 331 N.C. at 53-54, 413 S.E.2d at 795. According to the testimony of
both the victim and Ms. Freedman, the defendant, on foot, approached both
persons whom he had previously been acquainted around midnight and
requested a ride home. Id. Once the defendant had the victims in secluded
places he ordered them out of their vehicles or tried to pull them out of the
vehicle, and upon getting them outside he then ordered them to take down their
pants. Id. Further, after denying his requests, the defendant forcibly proceeded
to have multiple acts of vaginal intercourse including one act of fellatio with the
victim. Id. Moreover, after each incident the defendant inquired if he had hurt
the victims, and he displayed a modicum of concern for them. Id.
45. Id. at 40-41, 413 S.E.2d at 787. The court sentenced the defendant to ten
years imprisonment for the crime against nature, thirty years for kidnapping,
and forty years on the consolidated rape convictions. Id. The defendant was
convicted on three separate counts of rape because "each act of forcible sexual
intercourse constitutes a distinct and separate offense." Scott, 99 N.C. App. at
119, 392 S.E.2d at 624. "In this case, where an act of intercourse is interrupted
by some event, adverse weather conditions, and the act is terminated and then
after a new act of forcible intercourse begins, then that constitutes a separate
and distinct offense." Id.
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against him.46 The North Carolina Supreme Court dismissed the
defendant's appeal, but allowed his petition for discretionary
review 4 7 as to the court of appeals' determination of: "whether the
State may introduce in a subsequent criminal trial evidence of a
prior alleged offense for which the defendant had been tried and
48
acquitted in an earlier trial."
The North Carolina Supreme Court in a five to one decision
reversed 4 9 . Chief Justice Exum, writing the majority opinion,
held that where:
[A] defendant committed a prior alleged offense for which he has
been tried and acquitted [evidence of the prior crime] may not be
admitted in a subsequent trial for a different offense when its pro46. Scott, 331 N.C. at 41, 413 S.E.2d at 787. See supra notes 12 and 33.
47. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (1993). Section 7A-31 provides in pertinent
part:
Discretionary review by the Supreme Court.
(a) In any cause in which appeal is taken to the Court of Appeals[ ]
...the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, on motion of any party to
the cause or on its own motion, certify the cause for review by the
Supreme Court, either before or after it has been determined by the
Court of Appeals.... The effect of such certification is to transfer the
cause from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court for review by the
Supreme Court .... If the cause is certified for transfer to the Supreme

Court after its determination by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals.
(c) In causes subject to certification under subsection (a) of this
section, certification may be made by the Supreme Court after
determination of the cause by the Court of Appeals when in the opinion
of the Supreme Court:
(1) The subject matter of the appeal has significant public
interest, or
(2) The cause involves legal principles of major significance to
the jurisprudence of the State, or
(3) The decision of the Court of Appeals appears likely to be in
conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court.
Id.
48. Scott, 331 N.C. at 41, 413 S.E.2d at 787. Note, however, the limited
nature of the question addressed by the supreme court. The framing of this issue
is critical in terms of analyzing the dissent's interpretation of this decision and
its effects. In this author's opinion, such a narrowly defined issue ultimately
narrows the scope of the court's holding and prevents the far reaching
ramifications espoused by the dissent. For a discussion on the effects of the Scott
decision, see infra part C of the Analysis.
49. Id. Justice Lake did not participate in the decision, and Justice Meyer
was the lone dissenter. Id. The supreme court affirmed the crime against nature
conviction. Id.; see infra note 53 and accompanying text.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994
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bative value 50 depends, as it did here, upon the proposition that
the defendant in fact committed the prior crime .... To admit such

evidence violates, as a matter of law, [North Carolina] Evidence
Rule 403." ...[Thus,] [w]hen the intrinsic nature of the evidence
itself is such that its probative value is always necessarily outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the evidence becomes
inadmissible under ... [R]ule [403] as a matter of law. The evidence at issue here is of that sort.5 2

The court reversed the rape and kidnapping convictions, the
rationale being that the admission of Ms. Freedman's testimony
resulted in unfair prejudice to the defendant and warranted a new
53
trial.
BACKGROUND

A.

4

Rule 404(b)1

Rule 404(b) is the most litigated rule within the Rules of Evidence. 5" Rule 40456 sets out the general proposition that "evi50. Probative value is defined as "evidence[ ] having the effect of proof;
tending to prove, or actually proving[;][ ]... that which furnishes, establishes, or
contributes toward proof." BLAC's LAW DICTIONARY 1082 (5th ed. 1979)
(citations omitted).
51. See infra text accompanying notes 67-75.
52. Scott, 331 N.C. at 42-43, 413 S.E.2d at 788-89.
53. Id. at 46, 413 S.E.2d at 791. However, the court did not reverse the crime
against nature charge. Id. "Consent[ ] ...is not a defense to a crime against
nature. Defendant admitted he had committed cunnilingus upon the prosecuting
witness. Given this admission, Ms. Freedman's testimony could have had no
conceivable effect on whether the jury believed defendant had committed the
crime against nature." Id. at 46-47, 413 S.E.2d at 791.
54. Note that there are other rules of evidence which are fundamental in
determining whether evidence will be admissible. However, in the text of this
Note, those rules will not be discussed because they would assumably be
addressed prior to any Rule 403 and/or 404 determinations. The pertinent rules
are Rules 401 and 402. For a more detailed discussion of Rules 401 and 402 of
the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, see infra notes 62 and 63 respectively. In
addition, although numerically Rule 404(b) falls after Rule 403, the
determination of the admissibility of evidence of this nature-evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts-must first be examined under Rule 404. If the evidence

falls within the purview of Rule 404(b), then the trial judge must then make a
determination of whether the evidence is unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403.
For a more detailed discussion of Rule 403 and the determinations that must be
made, see infra text accompanying notes 65-75.
55. 1

GREGORY

P.

JOSEPH & STEPHAN A. SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA;

ch. 14 Rule 404, at 6 (1988). In this author's
opinion it is evident that the reason for such litigation is the potential advantage

THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES,
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dence of other offenses is admissible so long as it is relevant to any
fact or issue other than the character of the accused."5 7 However,
evidence of other offenses is not admissible if its sole or only relevancy is to show that defendant has the character or propensity to
commit a criminal act.5 Rule 404 is now considered one of inclusion, rather than one of exclusion for that reason. 59 Thus, many
or disadvantage that may flow from a Rule 404(b) determination. Thus, it is
interesting to note that the Scott decision limits this burdensome determination,
of whether the evidence does in fact fall within the rule, and promotes, in many
ways, judicial efficiency as well as the concerns expressed by the minority of
jurisdictions which do not allow the admission of prior acquittal evidence. For a
look at the jurisdictions that do not allow the use of prior acquittal evidence, and
the concerns they have expressed with the use of such evidence, see supra note 8.
56. Rule 404 deals primarily with character evidence and its inadmissibility
to prove conduct. North Carolina Rule 404 provides:
Character Evidence not Admissible to Prove Conduct: Exceptions;
Other Crimes.
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character
or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purposes of proving
that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of
character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the
prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of
peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case
to rebut the evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Characterof Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness,
as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake,
entrapment or accident.
Id.
57. State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 273, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990). Also, note
that subsection (b) of Rule 404 is not exhaustive. See State v. Morgan, 315 N.C.
624, 340 S.E.2d 84 (1986). "The list [of categories in Rule 404(b)] is neither
exclusive nor exhaustive." Id. at 637 n.2, 340 S.E.2d at 91 n.2 (citations omitted).
58. Coffey, 326 N.C. at 278, 389 S.E.2d at 54. Cf. 1 BRANDIS, supra note 41,
§ 91. Brandis reviews the somewhat erratic nature of the court's holdings in
North Carolina concerning the admissibility of other crimes evidence under Rule
404(b); many times within the same opinion. Id.
59. Coffey, 362 N.C. at 278, 389 S.E.2d at 54. Compare State v. McClain, 240
N.C. 171, 174, 81 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1954) (pre-rule case) (Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs or acts by a defendant falls under a "general rule of exclu[sion]
...subject

to certain.., exceptions .... .") with State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-
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times, admissibility generally falls on whether the other offense
evidence sought to be admitted can be framed within any one or
more of the categories set forth in subsection (b) of Rule 404.60
Subsection (b) of Rule 404 provides:
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment
or accident. 6 '
In Scott, the testimony of Ms. Freedman constituted relevant6 2 and otherwise admissible6 3 evidence. However, since the
79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990) (post-rule case) ("[G]eneral rule of inclusion of
relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by a defendant, subject to...
one exception requiring its exclusion if its only probative value is to show that the
defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of
the crime charged."). For a federal case discussing the "inclusion or exclusion"
issue, see United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1978). In Long the court
ultimately held that "[t]he draftsmen of Rule 404(b) intended it to be construed
as one of 'inclusion', and not 'exclusion'." Id. at 766.
60. But cf State v. Deleonardo, 315 N.C. 762, 770, 340 S.E.2d 350, 356 (1986)
("[T]he fact that evidence cannot be brought within a category [set forth in Rule
404(b)] does not necessarily mean that the evidence is inadmissible."); Morgan,
315 N.C. at 637 n.2, 340 S.E.2d at 91 n.2 (Rule 404(b) is merely illustrative).
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 404 (1992); see also supra notes 56 and 57.
Note that North Carolina Rule 404 is identical to its Federal counterpart, except
for the addition of "entrapment" in the last sentence of subsection (b),
Deleonardo, 315 N.C. at 769, 340 S.E.2d at 356, as well as the notice
requirement, provided for in the new federal rules, if other crimes evidence is
going to be introduced by the prosecution in criminal cases. The new Federal
Rule 404(b) provides in pertinent part:
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . may, however, be
admissible . . . . provided that upon request by the accused, the

prosecution in a criminal case shallprovide reasonablenotice in advance
of trial, or duringtrial if the court excuses notice for good cause shown, of
the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
FED. R. EVID. 404 (emphasis added).
62. Rule 401 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence provides:
Definition of "Relevant Evidence"
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (1992). The North Carolina Supreme Court has
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss2/4
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testimony was also "other crimes evidence," it had to fall within
interpreted this definition very broadly, as stated in State v. Stager, 329 N.C.
278, 404 S.E.2d 876 (1991):
Evidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency to prove a fact at issue
in a case, . . . and in a criminal case every circumstance to throw any
light upon the supposed crime is admissible and permissible. It is not
required that evidence bear directly on the question in issue, and
evidence is competent and relevant if it is one of the circumstances
surrounding the parties, and necessary to be known, to properly
understand their conduct or motives, or if it reasonably allows the jury
to draw an inference as to a disputed fact.
Id. at 302, 404 S.E.2d at 890 (citing State v. Riddick, 316 N.C. 127, 137, 340
S.E.2d 422, 428 (1986) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Arnold, 284 N.C. 41,
47, 199 S.E.2d 423, 426 (1973))). See, e.g., State v. Beach,-333 N.C. 733, 430
S.E.2d 248 (1993) (evidence that a person's capacity, to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law, is impaired has some tendency to prove he does not know the nature and
quality of his acts or the difference between right and wrong); State v. Baker, 333
N.C. 325, 426 S.E.2d 73 (1993) (medical opinion that the vagina of the victim had
been penetrated was relevant to the charge of taking indecent liberties with a
child, even though the child's testimony did not mention penetration); State v.
Whiteside, 325 N.C. 389, 383 S.E.2d 911 (1989) (evidence of footprints or shoe
prints at the scene of the crime corresponding to those of the accused is
admissible as relevant circumstantial evidence); Ferrell v. Frye, 108 N.C. App.
521, 424 S.E.2d 197 (1992) (details of an accident and evidence bearing on the
degree of severity of injury was properly admitted for a determination of
damages, even though defendant-appellant had stipulated his negligence and
that his negligence was the proximate cause of the injury).
63. Rule 402 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence sets the standard for
admissibility of relevant evidence. The North Carolina rule is identical to its
federal counterpart except for the addition of "by the Constitution of North
Carolina" and "by act of the General Assembly". N.C. R. EVID. 402 advisory
committee's note. Rule 402 provides:
Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence
Inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by the Constitution of North Carolina, by Act
of Congress, by Act of the General Assembly or by these rules. Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 402 (1992). As one author notes, "[t]hus, relevance
as defined in Rule 401 is the touchstone of admissibility and unless otherwise
excluded by law, relevant evidence is rendered per se admissible." 1 JOSEPH,
supra note 55, ch. 12 Rule 402, at 2. However, as Brandis notes in his treatise,
"restrictions such as the Rules, Statutes and the Constitutions, impose obvious
limitations on such sweeping statements as; 'in criminal cases, every
circumstance that is calculated to throw any light upon the supposed crime is
admissible'[,] and 'generally all relevant evidence is admissible'." 1 BaAN ms,
supra note 41, at 345 n.13 (citations omitted).
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the purview of Rule 404(b) to be allowed. The trial judge ruled the
evidence admissible under Rule 404(b) "to show opportunity,
intent, preparation and plan".64 At that point, however, the trial
judge faced a determination of whether there was any potential
unfair prejudice that might result from the admission of the other
offense evidence. 65 That determination is embodied within Rule
403 and requires a balancing of the probative value which must
by the unfair prejudicial effect of
not be substantially outweighed
66
the evidence if allowed.
B. Rule 40367
Rule 403 is many times the last hope for defendants and
defense attorneys to prevent the admissibility of otherwise damning evidence. For defense attorneys, as well as prosecuting attorneys, a Rule 403 ruling may be the most pivotal stage of a trial;
the potential for admission or exclusion of otherwise relevant and
pertinent evidence which could be extremely crucial in the ultimate determination of either an acquittal or a conviction. Rule
403 provides:
Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-

dice, 68 confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consid64. Scott, 331 N.C. at 41, 413 S.E.2d at 788. See also supra notes 41-43 and
accompanying text.
65. See generally infra text accompanying notes 67-75.
66. See generally Victor J. Gold, Comment, Federal Rule of Evidence 403:
Observations on the Nature of Unfairly PrejudicialEvidence, 58 WASH. L. REV.
497 (1983) (explaining the counterbalance that Rule 403 provides against the
enlarged scope of admissibility under the federal rules).
67. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (1992). "Rule 403 of the North
Carolina Rules of Evidence is identical to its federal counterpart." N.C. R. EVID.
403 advisory committee's note.
68. See 1 Strong, supra note 41, at 780-82. Note STRONG's elaboration on
some of the issues embodied within Rule 403, when he stated:
Prejudice does not simply mean damage to the opponent's cause, neither
does it necessarily mean an appeal to emotion. Prejudice can arise,
however, from facts that arouse the jury's hostility or sympathy for one
side without regard to the probative value of the evidence. Thus,
evidence of conviction for prior, unrelated crimes may lead a juror to
think that since the defendant already has a criminal record, an
erroneous conviction would not be quite as serious as would otherwise
be the case. A juror influenced in this fashion may be satisfied with a
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss2/4
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erations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence. 69
The wording of the statute exemplifies the draftsmen's intent
for the trial judge to be given very substantial discretion in "balancing" probative value on the one hand and "unfair prejudice" on
the other. 70 However, this discretion is not unlimited. For
instance, the Scott court opined that "[s]ound judicial discretion is
'that [which] is...
exercised... with regard to what is right and
equitable under the circumstance and the law, and directed by the
71
reason and conscience of the judge to a just result."
Once the decision is made that the probative value of the evidence outweighs the risk of prejudice, the evidence may be admitted; however, if the evidence is received, the judge should take
"pains to explain to the jurors the limited uses for which the evislightly less compelling demonstration of guilt than he should be.
Second, whether or not "emotional" reactions are at work, relevant
evidence can confuse or worse, mislead the trier of fact if he is not
properly equipped to judge the probative value of the evidence. Third,
certain proof and the answering evidence that it provokes might unduly
distract the jury from the main issues. Finally, the evidence offered and
the counterproof may consume an inordinate amount of time.
Id.
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (1992).
70. Long, 574 F.2d. at 767; 1 BRANDIS, supra note 41, at 355 n.42. Also, in
Long the court stated:
[The trial judge] should not be reversed simply because an appellate
court believes that it would have decided the matter otherwise because
of a differing view of the highly subjective factors of (a) probative value,
or (b) the prejudice presented by the evidence .... The trial judge, not
the appellate judge, is in the best position to assess the extent of the
prejudice caused a party by a piece of evidence. The appellate judge
works with a cold record, whereas the trial judge is there in the
courtroom.
Id. at 767. But see United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1979). In
Dolliole the court stated that:
[T]he use of the discretionary word "may" with respect to the
admissibility of evidence of crimes, wrongs, or acts is not intended to
confer any arbitrary discretion on the trial judge. Rather, it is
anticipated that with respect to permissible uses for such evidence, the
trial judge may exclude it only on the basis of those considerations set
forth in Rule 403 ....
Id. at 107.
71. Scott, 331 N.C. at 42, 413 S.E.2d at 789. See also State v. Kyle, 333 N.C.
687, 702, 430 S.E.2d 412, 420 (1993) ("[An] [a]buse of discretion results where the
court's ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could
not have been the result of a reasoned decision.") (citations omitted).
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dence is admitted."7 2 If the defendant contends that the trial
court erroneously admitted the evidence, then he must prove that
"but for" the erroneous admission, there is a "reasonable possibility" that the jury would have reached a different verdict.73
In Scott, the heart of the court's ruling and its precedential
effect revolves, at least facially, around its Rule 403 determination. As mentioned above, the court held that "when the intrinsic
nature of the evidence itself is such that its probative value is
always necessarily outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
it becomes inadmissible under [R]ule [403] as a matter of law."74
This holding sets forth a "bright-line" rule in which defendants
will no longer have the onerous burden of having to show prejudice to prevent the admissibility of prior acquittal evidence.75
Thus, in effect, the rule divests the trial judge of his discretionary
power as to evidence of this nature. The Scott court, rather than
allowing the trial judge to make the determination of "what is
equitable under the circumstances and the law", created this
"bright-line" rule to bar the admissibility of prior acquittal evidence. However, in light of the potential unfair prejudice to the
defendant, which results from the admission of such evidence, this
divestment appears ultimately justified.
72. State v. Davis, 106 N.C. App. 596, 603, 418 S.E.2d 263, 268 (1992). See
also supra note 40. But see Goldstein, supra note 6, at 1027. Goldstein points
out that "[ilnstructions are often the only statements made from the bench
telling jurors how they can lawfully consider the introduced evidence. Yet those
instructions are generally unclear and difficult to follow, and they are widely
thought to be disregarded by juries once the door to the jury room closes." Id.
See also United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In Daniels, the
court opined that "[t]o tell a jury to ignore the defendant's prior convictions in
determining whether he committed the offense being tried is to ask human
beings to act with a measure of dispassion and exactitude well beyond moral
capacities." Id. at 1118.
73. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1443 (1988); State v. Gibson, 333 N.C. 29, 424
S.E.2d 95 (1992). Compare State v. Weeks, 322 N.C. 152, 161, 367 S.E.2d 895,
902 (1988) ("[Ihf relevant evidence not involving a right arising under the
Constitution of the United States is erroneously excluded, the party asserting
such has the burden of showing that the error was prejudicial.") with State v.
Gappins, 320 N.C. 64, 68, 357 S.E.2d 654, 657 (1987). ("[11f the evidence was
improperly admitted the burden is on the party who asserts such to show both
error and that he was prejudiced by its admission.").
74. Scott, 331 N.C. at 43, 413 S.E.2d at 789. But see State v. Agee, 326 N.C.
542, 391 S.E.2d 171 (1990) (holding that prior acquittal evidence is admissible
when the evidence is within the "chain of circumstances" or the so-called "res
gestae" exception). See also infra text accompanying notes 114-18.
75. Scott, 331 N.C. at 42, 413 S.E.2d at 788.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss2/4

16

of Prior Acquittal
Evidence - Has North Carolin
1994] Sullivan: The Admissibility
EVIDENCE
PRIOR ACQUITAL
ANALYSIS

A.

Evidentiary Ruling
The North Carolina Supreme Court's holding in State v.

Scott 7 6 revolves, at least facially, around its evidentiary ruling.

The court's holding will not permit prior acquittal evidence, which
is otherwise relevant and admissible, to be admitted because of its

prejudicial impact." However, prior rulings by the same court in
cases very analogous to Scott-although in the context of allowing
prior acquittal evidence for the impeachment of witnesses-consistently accepted prior acquittal evidence without it being unduly

prejudicial. These cases, State v. Leonard,"s State v. Royal,79
State v. Ross,8 ° and State v. Herbins ' all set forth the general
proposition adhered to in this state; prior acquittal evidence is
admissible and the determination of prejudice is the responsibility
of the trial judge.8 2 If the trial judge failed to make a proper
inquiry or abused his discretion, then the judge's determination
would be reversed. 3 It would appear from a perfunctory review of
these cases that the established course for use of such prior
acquittal evidence slanted towards admission rather than exclu76. 331 N.C. 39, 413 S.E.2d 787 (1992).
77. See generally supra text accompanying Notes 50-52 and 74.
78. 300 N.C. 223, 266 S.E.2d 631, cert. denied 449 U.S. 960 (1980) (cross

examine on insanity). See also supra note 10.
79. 300 N.C. 515, 268 S.E.2d 517 (1980) (defendant who takes the stand is
subject to impeachment). See also supra note 10.
80. 295 N.C. 488, 246 S.E.2d 780 (1978) (impeachment allowed even though
charges have been dismissed). See also supra note 10.
81. 298 N.C. 441, 259 S.E.2d 263 (1979) (impeachment allowed even though
acquitted of those charges). See also supra note 10.
82. Leonard, 300 N.C. at 232, 266 S.E.2d at 238. Arguably, it appears that
the supreme court's ruling in Scott is limited to the use of the evidence in terms
of finding guilt, rather than for impeachment purposes. However, it is unclear
whether this decision may have an impact on future impeachment cases. For a
discussion on the impact or effect of the Scott decision, see infra part C of the
Analysis. In addition, for a more extensive work on the use of prior acquittal
evidence for impeachment of witnesses, where the authors contend that the use
of prior acquittal evidence is in violation of the concept of fundamental fairness
and the constitutional principle of double jeopardy, see generally Robert L.
Wilson, Jr. & M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., Comments, Impeachment of the
Criminal Defendant by PriorAcquittals- Beyond the Bounds of Reason, 17 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 561 (1981). See also 1 BRANDis, supra note 41, at 489 n.60
(author agrees with barring questioning or inquiry as to acts when witnesses
have been acquitted).
83. Leonard, 300 N.C. at 232, 266 S.E.2d at 638.
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sion. Thus, the Scott court misplaced its reliance, as the dissent
pointed out, on the case law of this state.8 4 The court, however,
ultimately relied upon case law within other jurisdictions to support its conclusion. 5
On the other hand, the rationale for the court may not totally
lie within the true prejudicial effect, under Rule 403, that the
court espouses. The court's rationale, at least in part, can be
found within the fundamental fairness and constitutional concerns set out by the court not only in Scott, but also in those cases
in which the court held the evidence of prior acquittals admissible.
Within Royal, Herbin, Ross, and Leonard there were strong dissenting opinions-several8 6 led by Justice Exum, now Chief Justice Exum, who wrote the opinion for the majority in Scottwhich adamantly expressed the potential prejudicial effect of
requiring a defendant to defend a second time against a crime
which had previously resulted in an acquittal.8 7 Thus, in that context, wrapped in the Scott majority's Rule 403 determination is its
previous concern of fundamental fairness and the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy.88 However, to assert that the
Rule 403 ruling is insignificant would be foolish, especially in light
of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Dowling v. United
States. 9 In Dowling, the Supreme Court rejected a defendant's
objection to the admission of prior acquittal evidence under the
constitutional arguments of double jeopardy and fundamental
84. Scott, 331 N.C. at 49-50, 413 S.E.2d at 792-93 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
85. Scott, 331 N.C. at 44, 413 S.E.2d at 789. In support of its evidentiary
conclusion, the court cited State v. Little, 350 P.2d 756 (Ariz. 1960); where the
court held that "[t]he fact of an acquittal.... when added to the tendency of such
evidence to prove the defendant's bad character and criminal propensities,
lowers the scale to the side of inadmissibility of such evidence." Id. at 763; and
State v. Holman, 611 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. 1981); where the court concluded that:
[T]he probative value of such evidence cannot be said to outweigh its
prejudicial effect upon the defendant. For such evidence to have any
relevance or use in the case on trial, the jury would have to infer that,
despite the acquittal, the defendant nevertheless was guilty of the prior
crime. No inference can properly be drawn from an acquittal.
Id. at 413.
86. Chief Justice Exum, then Justice Exum, dissented and filed opinions in
Ross, Royal, and Herbin. He joined in dissent with Justice Copeland in Leonard.
87. See generally infra note 99 and accompanying text.
88. See generally infra text accompanying notes 96-112.
89. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990). For a more detailed
discussion of the Dowling decision as well as the criticisms concerning the
Court's holding, see Goldstein, supra note 6; Crawford, supra note 6.
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fairness. 90 Moreover, the North Carolina Supreme Court recently
adopted the Dowling rationale in its decision of State v. Agee.9 1
Interestingly though, the Dowling Court refused to address the
evidentiary aspect of whether prior acquittal evidence could be
rendered inadmissible as a general rule.2 Thus, it appears that
the Scott majority, through its Rule 403 determination, sidestepped the ruling in Dowling without directly confronting the
Dowling court's rationale or its own position in Agee .93 Therefore,
defendants in North Carolina will no longer have to set forth constitutional arguments, s4 and can instead cite the Scott decision as
a bar to the admissibility of prior acquittal evidence.9 5
B.

FundamentalFairnessand ConstitutionalProtection.

Although the Scott court did not address9" the constitutional
defenses of double jeopardy9 7 and collateral estoppel,9 the
90. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 343. For definitions of double jeopardy and collateral
estoppel, see infra notes 97 and 98 respectively.
91. See Agee, 326 N.C. at 551, 391 S.E.2d at 176-77. The North Carolina
Supreme Court adopted the rationale of Dowling and refused to extend the
collateral estoppel doctrine to exclude in all circumstances relevant evidence that
was otherwise admissible under the Rules of Evidence merely because it related
to alleged criminal conduct for which the defendant had been acquitted. Id. But
see infra text accompanying notes 114-18.
92. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 343. Although the Court refused to address the
evidentiary question, it would appear from Justice White's opinion that the
Court would agree that the evidence was admissible, and the Rules of Evidence
would provided adequate protection. In Justice White's opinion he stated that
"[wie decline to extend . . . the Double Jeopardy Clause to exclude in all
circumstances, as Dowling would have it, relevant and probative evidence that is
otherwise admissible under the Rules of Evidence simply because it relates to
alleged criminal conduct for which the defendant has been acquitted." Id. at 348.
See also Agee, 326 N.C. at 551, 391 S.E.2d at 176-77.
93. See generally infra text accompanying notes 96-123.
94. See generally Goldstein, supra note 6, at 1028 (author contends that
defense attorneys should no longer look to constitutional safeguards but should
focus on not allowing the evidence or advocate clearer jury instructions as to its
use).
95. Even though the constitutional arguments are still viable alternatives, in
light of the Dowling, Agee, and Scott decisions, it appears uncontested, in this
author's opinion, that defendants in North Carolina as well as their attorneys
would be better off under a Rule of Evidence argument. See also supra note 92.
96. See supra notes 12 and 33.
97. Double Jeopardy is defined as the "[c]ommon-law and constitutional (Fifth
Amendment) prohibition against a second prosecution after a first trial for the
same offense. . . . The evil sought to be avoided is double trial and double
conviction, not necessarily double punishment." BLAcies LAw DICTIONARY 440
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supreme court's holding permeated with the tones of such constitutional protection. As mentioned above, the Scott rationale
resulted from the dissenting opinions of Leonard, Herbin, Ross,
and Royal. The main overarching theme being that "[w]hen one
has been tried... and acquitted of a particular crime that should
end the matter for all purposes. A person acquitted [of a prior
offense] should not be required continually to defend himself
against .. .[that previous] charge in a subsequent criminal proceeding. . . . "99 This theme is further buttressed by the courts's
statements in Scott, concerning the fundamental importance of an
acquittal, where it stated that:
An acquittal is the legal and formal certification of the innocence
of a person who has been charged ....10 0 Once a defendant has
been acquitted of a crime he has been set free or judicially discharged from an accusation[ ]... 101 The inescapable point is that
...[the] law requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal
(5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Delao, supra note
13, at 1042. Delao argues that:
Based on Ashe v.Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), admitting evidence of a
defendant's prior acquitted crime violates the principles embodied in the
double jeopardy clause. [In addition,] Ashe stands for the proposition
that issues necessarily decided for a defendant in a prior proceeding
cannot be relitigated. Introducing, the prior acquitted crime allows, if
not encourages, the jury to retry the defendant. Defendants are thus
forced to reestablish their innocence because juries often view evidence
of a prior offense as proof of guilt in the instant offense. Such a result
strikes at the foundation of the double jeopardy clause.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
98. The doctrine of collateral estoppel was established in the criminal arena
in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). Collateral Estoppel is defined as "[any]
[p]rior judgment between [the] same parties on [a] different cause of action is an
estoppel as to those matters in issue or points contested, on determination of
which finding or verdict was rendered." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 237 (5th ed.
1979) (citations omitted). For sources dealing with the collateral estoppel
question in the use of prior acquittal evidence as well as in general, see supra
note 6.
99. State v. Royal, 300 N.C. 515, 533, 268 S.E.2d 517, 530 (1980) (quoting
State v. Herbin, 298 N.C. 441, 259 S.E.2d 263 (1979) (Exum, J., concurring)). See
also 1 BRANDIS, supra note 41, at 489 n.60. Brandis argues that "[t]here were
dissents in all three cases[:] [Herbin, Leonard, and Royal]; and in Royal, Exum,
J.[- now Chief Justice-], joined by Carlton, J., makes a strong case, with which
this writer agrees, for barring inquiry as to the acts when the witness has been
charged and acquitted." Id.
100. Scott, 331 N.C. at 43, 413 S.E.2d at 789 (citing BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY
23 (5th ed. 1979)).
101. Id. (citing People v. Lyman, 65 N.Y.S. 1062, 1065 (N.Y. 1900)).
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cases as a standard of proof commensurate with the presumption
of innocence; a presumption not to be forgotten after the acquitting jury has left and sentencing has begun. ° 2 ... By definition,
when the Government fails to prove a defendant guilty . . ., the
defendant is considered legally innocent . . . [ 1; [t]he acquitted
defendant is to be treated as innocent and in the interests of fair10 3
ness and finality made no more to answer for his alleged crime.
(citations omitted).
The Scott majority is not merely paying "lip service" to what a
prior acquittal means in a legal and historical sense. 0 4 Moreover,
the court is expressing its double jeopardy concerns, under the
rubric of Rule 403, without setting forth those concerns
specifically.105
Furthermore, the Scott court is emphasizing the realization of
two important effects that may result from allowing the use of
prior acquittal evidence. First, it is all too likely that the jury will
punish for past crimes even if they are uncertain about the present charge; this resulting from the inherent ability of the jury to
believe the defendant not only committed the past crime as well as
the present one. 10 And second, there is little, if any, protection
remaining to defendants from the potential inferences the prosecutor can create in the minds of jurors simply by questioning or
102. Id. (citing State v. Marley, 321 N.C. 415, 424-25, 364 S.E.2d 133, 138
(1988) (quoting State v. Cote, 530 A.2d 775, 784 (N.H. 1987))).
103. Scott, 331 N.C. at 43, 413 S.E.2d at 789 (citing Dowling, 493 U.S. at 361
n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J., and Stevens, J.) (quoting
State v. Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d 307, 308 (Minn. 1979))).
104. This is in contrast to how a majority of courts see an acquittal, which is
correct in a legally conceptual sense only; those courts view "an acquittal [a]s...
[only a result reached because] the State failed to... prov[e the defendant guilty]
beyond a reasonable doubt." Scott, 331 N.C. at 50, 413 S.E.2d at 793 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting).
105. See generally supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
106. See Delao, supra note 13, at 1046-47. The author argues that:
The jury . . . sees two victims pointing accusatory fingers at the
defendant, although one jury has already determined that one finger
points unjustly. The adage "where there is smoke there is fire" begins
taking a mental foothold in the collective psyche of the jury. If the
defendant cannot again disprove the prior crime, the jury is very likely
to return a guilty verdict. This is particularly true where the defendant
was acquitted of the prior crime because "the jury may feel that the
defendant should be punished for that prior activity even if he is not
guilty of the offense charged."
Id. (quoting United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914 (5th Cir. 1978) (en
banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979)) (footnotes omitted).
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even referring to those previous crimes or offenses. 1 0 7 To the
majority in Scott, requiring the defendant to defend against previously acquitted crimes, in effect, makes the defendant "run the
gauntlet" a second time.1 08 Therefore, the Scott holding appears
to be in full accord with the constitutional safeguards set out for
criminal defendants, without the onerous burdens accompanying
such determinations.
As to fundamental fairness, the holding in Scott falls squarely
within the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Wingate v. Wainwright.10 9 The Wainwright decision was one of the first cases that
set forth the concept of fundamental fairness in the context of
prior acquittal evidence. In the Wainwright opinion is the often
repeated quote:
It is fundamentally unfair and totally incongruous with our basic
concepts of justice to permit the sovereign to offer proof that a
defendant committed a specific crime which the jury of that sovereign has concluded he did not commit. Otherwise a person could
never remove himself from the blight and suspicious aura which
surround an accusation that he is guilty of a specific crime.' t0
Thus, the Scott majority arrived at this "bright-line" rule to bar
the admission of prior acquittal evidence, which enables defendants to escape the "blight and suspicious aura" which concerned
the Wainwright court, while the majority of the state and federal
courts do not afford such protection. 1 1 '
C. Effect of Scott.
The two most obvious effects of the Scott decision are (1) the
protection afforded to criminal defendants against what is other107. See Goldstein, supra note 6, at 1027.
108. See generally Scott, 331 N.C. at 43-44, 413 S.E.2d 788-89; Ashe, 397 U.S.
at 445.
109. 464 F.2d 209 (1972).
110. Wingate, 464 F.2d at 215. See also Delao, supra note 13, at 1045. The
author compares the use of prior acquittal evidence to the use of uncounseled
prior convictions and the parity that should result from this comparison. He
notes that in the United States Supreme Court case of Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S.
473 (1972), the "Court ruled that a state may not use prior uncounseled
convictions for the limited purpose of impeaching a defendant. If this use of prior
convictions is fundamentally unfair, using prior acquittal crime to prove an
element of another crime is grossly unfair." Delao, supra note 13, at 1045. This
is in stark contrast to the Supreme Court's holding in Dowling. See Dowling, 493
U.S. at 343. See also the second part of supra note 6.
111. See generally Bello, supra note 3.
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wise relevant and admissible evidence in other jurisdictions, and
(2) the limiting of discretionary power attributable to trial judges
in the context of prior acquittal evidence under Rule 403. As mentioned above, defendants in North Carolina will no longer have to
battle the State's ability to try and frame prior acquittal evidence
within the purview of Rule 404(b), or prove undue prejudice if in
fact the evidence is admitted. Under this framework, the defendant will be tried for the present offense, and not
for one he is sup112
posed to be innocent of in the eyes of the law.
However, even though the ruling in Scott bars the admission
of prior acquittal evidence, there is one scenario in which this type
of evidence may still be allowed. The Scott majority went to great
lengths to distinguish its holding from its other recent decision in
State v. Agee.
In Agee, the supreme court held that "despite the
defendant's [earlier] acquittal, evidence of his marijuana possession had some probative value by virtue of its inextricable connection to the chain of circumstances[ ] [in the present charge]."" 4
The majority in Scott tried to distinguish Agee because of the
"chain of circumstances link that arguably made this evidence
probative [and admissible] in Agee[,] by virtue of its temporal relevance to the crime for which the defendant was on trial. . .", was
absent in Scott." 5 However, based on the rule set out in Scott it

would appear that Agee would have limited, if any, significance.
The limited occasions in which cases like Agee can arise and the
potential for abuse by prosecutors," 6 in trying to fall within the
now so-called "Agee exception", will inevitably lessen, if not totally
discard, the significance of Agee. Furthermore, if the principles
set out in Scott are to stand true and reflect the underlying ration112. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
113. 326 N.C. 542, 391 S.E.2d 171 (1990).
114. Scott, 331 N.C. at 45-46, 413 S.E.2d at 790.
115. Id. at 46, 413 S.E.2d at 790-91.
116. See Delao, supra note 13, at 1045-46. The author points out that:
Another form of unfairness stems from prosecutorial [over]zealousnes3.
In Ashe v. Swenson, the Court noted that the government improved its
strategy at the second trial by not calling a witness whose identification
testimony was "conspicuously negative" during the first trial, and that
witnesses who did testify again were much surer of their identification.
It is repugnant to the principles symbolized by the double jeopardy
clause to allow a prosecutor to perfect the government's case against a
defendant and retry the matter under the guise of other crimes
evidence.
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ale of the court, Agee will most likely be rendered null in future
situations.

117

As to the discretionary powers of trial judges pursuant to
Rule 403, the Scott decision has rendered such powers-in the
context of prior acquittal evidence-non-existent. 11 However,
due to the likely unfair prejudice that results to criminal defendants from the admission of prior acquittal evidence, this result is
ultimately justified. Furthermore, because courts as a general
proposition have been callous to the prejudicial effect of other
crimes evidence-and as a result have made -noreal effort to balance prejudice against probative value-the removal of their discretion is justified and promotes the real purpose of Rule 403.119

The effect of the Scott decision not yet answered is the impact
on evidentiary matters other than prior acquittal evidence. As the
dissent pointed out, "the application of the new rule is not limited
to evidence of prior crimes of which the defendant has been acquitted." 20 However, the dissent's interpretation, albeit in accordance with the holding of the court, may not be correct. First, due
to the limited nature of the question addressed by the court, it
would appear that the court's decision would be limited to prior
acquittal evidence in the criminal arena only. 121 Furthermore,
since the majority did not make such an overarching statement,
and facially adhered to Agee, the true effect on other aspects of
evidentiary questions is yet to be answered.
On the other hand, there is the distinct possibility that the
majority's rationale in Scott may continue to expand. The court's
decision appears to confine Agee to very limited, or even nonexistent, circumstances and jeopardizes the holdings in Leonard,
Herbin, and their progeny concerning the admission of prior
acquittal evidence for impeachment purposes. 22 If the majority
117. See Delao, supra note 13, at 1055-56. Delao notes the potential use of
prior acquittal evidence "to complete the story", but qualifies the statement in
that such use is generally rendered inadmissible under the Wingate rationale. Id.
This author contends that since the Scott court relied, at least partially, upon
the Wingate rationale for its decision, this would, along with the potential for
prosecutorial abuse, work to further undermine the Agee court's holding allowing
the use of "complete the story" or "res gestae" evidence.
118. Scott, 331 N.C. at 47, 413 S.E.2d at 791 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
119. See generally Gold, supra note 66. The author notes the courts inability
many times to handle a determination of other crimes evidence under Rule 403.
120. Scott, 331 N.C. at 47, 413 S.E.2d at 791 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
121. See generally supra note 48 and accompanying text.
122. See generally supra note 82.
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in Scott-previously the minority in other impeachment casescan again persuade the court that the concept of fairness and the
finality of judgments should prevail, and the underlying rationale
used in Scott stands, then the majority in Scott may once again
conquer. However, the true effect of Scott, both in North Carolina
and in other jurisdictions, is yet to be seen in the wake of this
substantial departure from what appeared to be the position of the
courts in this state as well as the majority of courts in the United
States.
CONCLUSION

The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Scott 1 23 established a "bright-line" rule in which the use of prior
acquittal evidence in a subsequent criminal trial is per se inadmissible. 1 24 Although this is the minority view, 25 it is in full accord
with the concept of fundamental fairness, the finality of judgments, and the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy.
The court encompassed these safeguards within a Rule 403 overlay as an efficient means for lawyers and judges to limit the
State's ability to use prior crimes against the defendant and to
promote efficiency within the system. While all of the potential
effects of Scott are uncertain, there is one aspect which will ring
loud and clear; the preservation of judgments and the strong public policy interest in protecting individuals from governmental
overreaching are fulfilled.
Matthew S. Sullivan

123. 331 N.C. 39, 413 S.E.2d 787 (1992).
124. See generally supra text accompanying note 9.
125. See generally supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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